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Abstract
Theconceptofanon-extreme-outcome-additivecapacity(neo-additivecapacity)isintro-
duced. Neo-additivecapacitiesmodel optimistic andpessimisticattitudes towards uncer-
tainty as observed in many experimental studies. Moreover, neo-additive capacities can
be appliedeasily ineconomic problems, aswedemonstrate by examples. This paper pro-
vides an axiomatisation of Choquet expected utility with neo-capacities in a framework
of purely subjective uncertainty.
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* WewouldliketothankMicheleCohen,Peter Hartley, Jean-Yves Jaffray, MarkMachina,KlausNehring,
Matthew Ryan, Jean-MarcTallon, andJean-ChristopheVergnaudfor extremelystimulating and helpfuldis-
cussions.‘‘That the chance of gain is naturally over-valued we may
learn fromthe universal success of lotteries. [...] The vain
hope of gaining some of the great prizes is the sole cause of
this demand. The soberest people scarce look upon it as a
folly to pay a small sum for the chance of gaining ten or twen-
ty thousand pounds.’ ’
Adam Smith (1776)
‘‘The Wealth of Nations’’ (p.210).
“Overconfidence, however generated, appears to be a funda-
mental factor promoting the high volume of trade we observe
in speculative markets. Without such confidence, one would






to “irrational” optimism and pessimism. Economic theory, however, finds it difficult to
see in such moods a major factor determining economic behavior. With large amounts of
money and wealth at stake, as in the investment behavior of traders in financial markets,
one hesitates to attribute major influence on decisions to vague notions of belief.
Faced with uncertainty economists like to think of investors as cool analysts, carefully
weighing likelihoods of events relevant for their decisions. Yet, many observers of in-
vestment behavior in financial markets, from Keynes (1921) to Robert Shiller
(2001),could not escape the conclusion that psychological effects seem to interact with
probabilistic information in shaping investors’ behavior.
Embracing Ramsey’s (1926) and de Finetti’s (1937) personalistic view of proba-
bility, Savage (1954) provided aset ofbehavioral postulatesshowingthat it is possible
to view decision makers’ behavior in the face of uncertainty as guided by a consistent
system of probabilistic beliefs. His axioms gave researchers an opportunity to put these
postulates to direct tests. Allais (1953)and Ellsberg (1962) werethemost promi-
2nent articlesreportingchoicebehaviorofpeoplewhichcontradictsSavage’spostulates. In
particular, the Sure-Thing-Principle which allows one todecompose a decision problem,
omitting ‘‘equivalent parts’’ and focussing choice on the remaining parts, was quickly
identified as especially problematic.
There are behavioral regularities which influence individuals’ betting behavior. People
distinguish categorically between situations which they considerascertain,just possible,
or strictly impossible. These consistently observed certainty and impossibility effects
cannot be modeled by a transition from zero probability of an event to a positive proba-
bility, or from a positive probability to the probability of one.
A typical lottery with a high prize on a very unlikely event can turn the certainty of low
wealth for a poor person into the possibility of great riches, providing a reason for ac-
cepting an unfair gamble. Conversely, rich people may find the possibility of loosing
substantial amounts of wealth so dangerous that high expected returns are necessary to
induce them to an investment.
Bell (1985)interpretsthesepsychologicalbiasesasdisappointmentaversion orelation-
seeking behavior. He studies situations where these biases determine the behavior, such
as the process of releasing information, behavior in auctions and the Ellsberg paradox.
Basedontheseobservationshearguesforaninverse-Sshapedpatternofdecisionweights
as an adequate representation of individual attitudes towards uncertainty.
Optimistic behavior overestimates the likelihood of goodoutcomes while pessimistic at-
titudes exaggerate the likelihood of bad outcomes. Based upon mounting experimental
evidence for certainty and impossibility effects, Wakker (2001) extends these no-
tions to arbitrary events with rank-ordered outcomes and characterizes optimistic and
pessimistic attitudes. In the context of the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model, con-
cave capacities reflect optimistic attitudes towards uncertainty, while convex capacities
model pessimism.
1.1 Experimental evidence
Camerer (1995)reviewsnumerous studiesrefutingthevalidityof theexpectedutility
3approach as a description of individual behavior. More recently, however, experiments
find evidence for typical patterns of deviation from the expected utility model. In par-
ticular, one often observes subjects willing to bet on high outcomes with lowprobability
whilerefusingtoacceptevensmall risks. For subjectschoosingbetweenlotteries,onecan
explain such behavior by a function w(p) weighting the probability p of events. Experi-
mental studies by Gonzalez & Wu (1999), Abdellaoui (2000), Bleichrodt








Figure 1: Probability weighting function
The decision weight of an event E, w(p(E)), measured by the willingness to bet on this
event,differs usuallyfrom the probabilityof the event p(E): Figure 1shows aninverse-S
shaped weighting function, overweighting probabilities close to zero and underweight-
ing probabilities close to one as. Tversky & Wakker (1995)study the relationship
between decision weights and attitudes towards risk and characterize the possibility and
certaintyeffects. Wakker (2001)definesoptimism andpessimism intermsofdecision
weights. This article contains also a brief survey of the relevant experimental literature.
Kilka & Weber (2001)demonstratehowdecisionweights andsubjectiveprobabilis-
tic beliefs can be distinguished in experiments.
41.2 Axiomatic treatments
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Figure 2: Neo-additive capacity
This weighting scheme,whichwecallneo-additivecapacity for reasonsexplainedbelow,
has a simple Choquet integral. Integratingover a lottery yields a weighted average of the
expected utility of the lottery and its maximal and minimal outcomes.
In the context of choice of objective lotteries there are a few studies providing behav-
ioral axioms for functionals which combine expected utility with minimum utility and
maximum utility approach. Gilboa (1988) and Jaffray (1988) independently ax-
iomatize a functional which aggregates the expected utility functional and the minimum
utility functional in amonotonic function. Their representations captureonlypessimistic
attitudes towards uncertainty. Cohen (1992), in contrast, provides axioms for a repre-
sentationof preferencesover lotteriesas aweightedaverage ofexpectedutility,minimum
utility and maximum utility. For the context of choice over lotteries, her paper provides
the behavioral foundations for the representationstudied inthis paper. To our knowledge
5there is no axiomatization for choice over acts in either the Anscombe-Aumann or the
Savage framework.
The neo-additive weighting scheme provides an easy way to model the certainty and
the impossibility effects. Combined with a probability function Pr(:) over ranges of
monetary outcomes, this weighting scheme models an individual who overweights the
likelihood of a monetary outcome x exceeding x;
w(Pr(x > x)) = ¸+ (1¡ ¸ ¡ °)¢ Pr(x > x)
> Pr(x > x);
whenever Pr(x > x) < ¸=(¸+ °): In contrast, outcomes below x occurring with low
probability Pr(x · x) obtain a weight,
w(Pr(x · x)) ´ 1 ¡ w(1 ¡ Pr(x > x))
= (1 ¡¸)¡ (1 ¡¸ ¡ °)(Pr(x · x))
> Pr(x · x);
whenever Pr(x · x) < °=(¸ +°).
In the next section, we introduce some notation and concepts necessary for our analysis.
Section 3 studies the neo-additive weighting scheme in the context of the CEU model.
This parameterized CEU model can be easily applied to economic models in order to
analyse the implications of thecertainty andimpossibilityeffect. Section 4illustrates the
potentialof theneo-additive CEUrepresentationforeconomicapplicationsinthecontext
of a portfolio choice model. Section 5 provides an axiomatic treatment of neo-additive
capacities in a framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Proofs are collected in an
appendix.
2. Capacities and the Choquet integral
We assume that the uncertainty a decision maker faces can be described by a non-empty
set of states, denoted by S. This set may be finite or infinite. Associated with the set
of states is the set of events, taken to be a sigma-algebra of subsets of S, denoted by E:
6We assume that for eachs inS, fsg is inE. Capacities are real-valued functions defined
on E, that generalize the notion of probability distributions. Formally, a capacity is a
normalized monotone set function.
Definition2.1 A capacity is a function º : E ! R which assigns real numbers to
events, such that
(i) E;F 2 E; E µ F implies º(E) 6 º(F); monotonicity
(ii) º(;) = 0 and º(S) = 1: normalization
Acapacity º is called convex if º(E[F) ¸ º(E)+º(F)¡º(E\F)holdsforarbitrary
eventsE;F 2 E: Ifthereverseinequalityholdsthenthecapacityiscalledconcave. Prob-
ability distributions are special cases of capacities whicharebothconcaveand convex.
For each capacity º there is a dual or conjugate capacity º defined by º(E) = 1 ¡
º (S ¡ E) forallE 2 E:Ifthedual capacityº isconvex, thenthecapacityº isconcave.
The most common way to integrate functions with respect to a capacity is the Choquet
integral. Let f : S ! R be a E-measurable real-valued function. We consider finite
outcome acts and suppose that f has finite range, that is, the set f(S) is finite. We call
a function f with these properties a simple function. The Choquet integral can therefore
be written in the following intuitive form.
Definition2.2 For any simple function f the Choquet integral with respect to the ca-




u¢ [º(fsj f(s) ¸ ug) ¡ º(fsj f(s) > ug)]:
Eachelement intherangehasadecisionweightequal tothedifferencebetweenthecapac-
ity of the states yielding an element better or equal than the one under consideration and
thecapacity of the states yieldinga strictly better outcome. The Choquet integral is inter-
preted astheexpectedvalueof the functionf with respect tothe capacityº: Thedecision
weights used in the computation of the Choquet integral will overweight high outcomes
if the capacity is concave and will overweight lowoutcomes if the capacity is convex. It
is therefore well-suited to model such responses toambiguity as optimism or pessimism.
7Sarin & Wakker (1998) provide a detailed discussion of decision weights.
3. Neo-additive capacities
Choquet expectedutility(CEU)maximiserswill never beton events E 2 E withcapacity
value º(E) = 0; nor will they bet against events F 2 E with capacity value º(F) = 1:
An event with capacity value zero will therefore never influence the choice of a CEU
decision maker and can be calleda null event. Similarly, an event with capacity value of
one will becalled universal event. For probabilitydistributions,thecomplement of anull
event will necessarily be a universal event. For general capacities, this is not true except
fortheemptyset andits complement, the statespace S: As Example3.1belowillustrates,
it is useful to allowfor other null events with complements which are universal.
Let Z 2 E be the largest null event in E such that S¡Z is universal. Sincecapacities are
monotonic,everyevent E ½ Z mustalsobeanullevent andS¡Emustbeuniversal. All
theseeventswillhavea capacityvalue ofzeroandthe capacityvalue oftheircomplement
is one. In many cases, Z = ; is the largest set with these properties.
In this section we introduce a special kind of capacity which we call a neo-additive ca-
pacity because it is additive onnon-extreme outcomes, if these occur onessential events.
Neo-additive capacities can be viewed as a convex combination of an additive capacity
and two capacities, one of which reflects complete ignorance or complete ambiguity,
denoted ¹0, and another which reflects complete confidence, denoted ¹1.




1 for S ¡ E µ Z
0 otherwise , ¹
1(E) :=
½
0 for E µ Z
1 otherwise :
The capacity ¹0 is convex. The capacity ¹1 is the conjugate of ¹0, that is ¹1(E) = 1 ¡
¹0(S ¡ E) for all E in E, and therefore is concave.
Let ¼ be a finitely additive probability distribution defined over E, such that ¼ (A) = 0
for all A µ Z and ¼ (B) = 1 for all S ¡ B µ Z. Denote by ¢ := f(®;¯)j ® ¸ 0;
¯ ¸ 0; ® + ¯ · 1g the simplex in R2:
8Definition3.2 For a given finitely additive probability distribution ¼ on (S;E) with
¼(E) = 0 for E µ Z, and a pair of numbers (°;¸) 2 ¢, a neo-additive capacity
º(¢j¼;°;¸) is defined as
º(Ej¼;°;¸) := ° ¢ ¹
0(E) + ¸¢ ¹
1(E)+ (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ ¼(E)
for all E in E.
It is straightforward to derive the Choquet integral of a simple function f with respect
to a neo-additive capacity in terms a weighted sum of the act’s infimum over S ¡ Z, its
supremum over S ¡ Z and its expectation with respect to ¼.
Lemma 3.1 The Choquet expected value of a simple function f : S ! R with respect
to the neo-additive capacity º(Ej¼;°;¸) is given by:
V(fjº(¢j¼;°;¸)) := °¢ inf
S¡Z
f + ¸¢ sup
S¡Z
f + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ E¼[f]: (1)
Proof. To see this note that V(fj¹0) = inf
S¡Z
f V(fj¹1) = sup
S¡Z
f and V (fj¼) = E¼[f]:
The result then follows from the linearity of the Choquet integral with respect to the
capacity (Denneberg (2000), Properties (ix) and (x) on page 49).
Notice that we do not require that ¼(E) = 0 implies E to be null. Indeed nothing in the
definitionsabove ruleout Z = ?; andhence S to betheonly universal event in E. Inthis
case, if for some event E 6= ;, ¼(E) = 0, º(E) = ¸ is positive and º (S ¡ E) = 1¡ °
is less than one. That is, an event E may receivea zerodecisionweight in the evaluation
of the Choquet expected value for any act with neither its infimum nor its supremum on
E: If the infimum (respectively, supremum) occurs in a state of E; however, the decision
weight on E is ° (respectively, ¸). For further illustration of this point, consider the
following example.
Example 3.1 Suppose S is the unit interval, [0;1], E is the Borel sigma algebra and
¼ a uniform distribution. If a decision maker is only willing to bet on states in [0:5;1];
considering states in [0;0:5) impossible, one can model such beliefs and behaviour by
the maximal null event Z = [0;0:5) and ¼ the uniform distribution on [0:5;1]. Clearly,
9¼(s) = 0 for all s 2 S; yet º(s) = 0 for s 2 [0;0:5) and º(s) = ¸ for s 2 [0:5;1]:
Moreover , though ¼(S ¡ fsg) = 1 for all s 2 S; we have º(S ¡ fsg) = 1 ¡ ° for all
s 2 [0:5;1]; since S ¡ (S ¡ fsg) = fsg * Z in this case.
Example3.1 shows also that anevent as fsg maymatterforthedecision maker if the best
or worst outcome is associated with it, even if it has probability zero.
Several well-known decision criteria can be viewed as special cases of the Choquet in-
tegral of a neo-additive capacity:
(i) ° = ¸ = 0 expected utility,
(ii) 1 ¸ ° > 0; ¸ = 0 pure pessimism,
(iii) ° = 0; 1 ¸ ¸ > 0 pure optimism,
(iv) ° +¸ = 1 Hurwitz criterion.
Neo-additive capacities satisfy three conditions:
² They are additive for pairs of events which are not null and do not form a partition of
a universal event.
² They exhibit uncertainty aversion for some events.
² They exhibit uncertainty preference for some other events.
Indeed, as the following proposition shows, these conditions characterize neo-additive
capacities completely.
Proposition 3.1 Let º be acapacity on(S;E); whereE contains at least three pairwise
disjoint events E1, E2 and E3 with 0 < º(Ei) < 1 for i = 1;2;3: Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) º is a neo-additive capacity,
(ii) the capacity º satisfies the following properties:
(a) for any three events (E;F;G) 2 E £ E £ E suchthat E \F = ; = E \G;
º(E [F) < 1and º(E [G) < 1;
º(E [F) ¡ º(F) = º(E [G) ¡ º(G);
(b) for some (E;F) 2 E £ E such that E \F = ; and º(E [F) < 1;
º(E [F) · º(E) + º(F);
10(c) for some (E;F) 2 E £ E such that E \F = ; and º(E [F) < 1;
º(E [F) · º(E) + º(F):
Proof. Appendix.
Note that for a neo-additive capacity º on (S;E); where E contains at least three non-
null events, as assumed throughout thepaper, uniquenessof thepessimism and optimism
coefficients (°;¸) and of the underlying probability measure ¼ is guaranteed. This is
proved in a lemma preceding the proof of Proposition 3.1 in the appendix.
Property (iia) establishesadditivity oftheneo-additive capacityfor eventsthat yieldnon-
extreme outcomes. According to property (iib), the capacity overweights the event in
which the most preferred prize is obtained, hence ¸ ¸ 0: Property (iic) says the capacity
overweights also the event with the least preferred prize. It implies ° ¸ 0:
3.1 Optimism and pessimism
In this section we will provide two arguments why one may be justified to interpret the
overweighting ofthe extremeoutcomeswiththe notions ofoptimism andpessimism. The
firstargument showsthatneo-additivecapacitiesareaspecialcaseof thebehaviouralcon-
cept of optimism and pessimism advanced in Wakker (2001). The second argument
appeals totheintuitive notion of optimism and pessimism suggested by the context of the
multiple prior approach.
3.1.1 The behavioural approach of Wakker (2001)
Inspired by the Allais and Ellsberg paradox, Wakker (2001) suggests a notion of op-
timism and pessimism based on choice behaviour over acts. This approach derives its
appeal from its immediate testability in experiments and its natural representation by
properties of capacities.
Properties(iib)and (iic) of Proposition 3.1imply the neo-additive capacity tobe concave
on some events, which corresponds to the notion of optimism suggested in Wakker
(2001),andconvexonsomeothers,hencepessimistic inthesenseofWakker (2001).
Tosee this,considerthefollowingfouractsf1;f2;f3;f4definedonapartition ofthestate
space (B;A;I;L) with real outcomes M > m > 0.
11B A I L
f1 M m m 0
f2 M M 0 0
f3 m m m m
f4 m M 0 m
(*)
Assume that m is chosen such that V (f1) = V (f2): Wakker (2001) calls a decision
maker pessimistic if V(f3) > V (f4) and optimistic if V(f3) < V (f4): Of course, an
expected utility maximiser must be indifferent between f3 and f4:
If the decision maker is indifferent between acts f1 and f2; then mmeasures the willing-
ness to pay for the gamble M on A and 0 on I conditional on the gamble M on B and
0 on L: If f3 is preferred to f4; then the gamble M on A and 0 on I is worth less than
m because there is no chance of losing in event L: This special attention given to bad
outcomes is associated with pessimism. In contrast, an optimist, will be willing to pay
more for the gamble M on A and 0on I if there is no chance of winning in event B:
Consideraneo-additivecapacity º(¢j¼;°;¸):FromV (f1jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) = V(f2jº(¢j¼;°;¸)),
we conclude that
(1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ [m¢ ¼(A) + m¢ ¼(I)] = (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ M ¢ ¼(A):
It turns out that neo-additive capacities exhibit pessimism for some acts and optimism
for others.
Case (i): pessimism
V (f3jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) > V (f4jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) implies ° > 0; since simple computations show
that V(f3jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) > V (f4jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) if and only if m ¢ (° + ¸) > ¸ ¢ M: Hence,
° > 0: Moreover, it is straightforward that V (f3jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) > V (f4jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) for
any M > m > 0 is equivalent to ¸ = 0 and ° > 0; i.e., pure pessimism.
Case (ii): optimism
Similarly,V (f3jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) < V(f4jº(¢j¼;°;¸))implies¸ > 0,andV(f3jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) <
V (f4jº(¢j¼;°;¸)) for any M > m > 0 is equivalent to ° = 0 and ¸ > 0; i.e., pure op-
timism.
12Neo-additive capacities showbothoptimismandpessimism astheyrelate to thecertainty
and the impossibility effect
1.
3.1.2 The multiple-prior approach
The multiple-prior approach assumes that uncertainty of a decision maker can be repre-
sented by a set of probability distributions D: The evaluation of an act is the expected
utility with respect to the probability distributions in the set D: Attitudes towards the
ambiguity about the correct probability distribution can then be captured by the weights
which the decision maker puts on the best or worst expected utility over the set D:
Without loss of generality, but for the ease of exposition, assume there is a finite set of
statesS = f1;:::;ng: Theset of probabilitydistributionsover S is the simplex ¢n inthis
case. Lettheset ofprobabilitydistributionsD µ ¢n;whichthedecisionmakerconsiders
possible, be compact and convex. In the multiple-prior approach preferences over acts
(x1;:::;xn) are represented by the preference functional
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The parameter ® 2 [0;1] represents the weight given to the worst expected utility and
(1 ¡ ®) is the weight given to the best expected utility. Optimism corresponds to the
weight given the best expected utility and pessimism to the weight given the worst ex-
pectedutility. Anicefeature ofthisapproachisthenatural separationbetween ambiguity,
reflected by the set D; and attitudes towards ambiguity, reflected by the degrees of pes-
simism ® and optimism (1 ¡ ®):
The Choquet expected utility of a neo-additive capacity defined in Equation 1 can be
viewed as a multiple-prior expected utility. Applied to the case of a finite state space, it
is not difficult to verify the following equality:
V (x1;:::;xnjº(¢j¼;°;¸)) :=
1 They are cavex in the sense of Wakker (2001, p. 1049), that is concave for events which are
revealed unlikely and convex for events which are revealed as likely.
13°¢ min
s2S
u(xs) + ¸¢ max
s2S































D := fe ¼ 2 ¢nj e ¼s ¸ (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼s; s 2 Sg:
Note that the set of probabilities D is convex and compact. Moreover, it has a nice geo-
metric structure as Figure3 illustratesfor the case of n = 3: For a neo-additive capacity
q
q q
~ ¼1 = 1 ~ ¼2 = 1
~ ¼3 = 1
s ¼
Figure 3: Multiple priors
º(¢j¼;°;¸) the set of possible probability distributions D is centered around the proba-
bility distribution ¼ and has a size determined by ° + ¸: Hence, ° + ¸ can be viewed
as the degree of ambiguity about the additive probability distribution ¼: The degree of
pessimism
°
°+¸ and the degree of optimism
¸
°+¸ measure the decision maker’s attitude
towards this ambiguity. Thus, neo-additive capacities have also a natural interpretation
in the context of the multiple-prior approach.
It is well-known that the Choquet expected utility approach is equivalent to the multiple
14prior approach if capacities are convex. In general however, neo-additive capacities are
neither convex nor concave. The multiple-prior representation of the Choquet integral of
neo-additive capacities is a special caseof themore general multiple prior-representation
axiomatised recentlyby Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci (2002) and is
similar to the ®-maxmin expected utility approach of Kopylov (2002).
4. Economic Applications
The ups and downs of economic activity during the business cycle which are usually
accompanied by swings in investors’ sentiments, ranging from bull to bear spirits in fi-
nancial markets, provide numerous examples of the impact of uncertainty on economic
behavior.
Neo-additive capacities provide a natural way for modelling optimism and pessimism
influencing economic activities. The parameters of a neo-additive capacity can be inter-
preted as measuring confidence in beliefs and degrees of optimism and pessimism. A
neo-additive capacity º(Ej¼;°;¸) is based on an additive probability distribution ¼ re-
flecting the subjective beliefs of the decision maker. It represents an assessment of the
likelihood of events consistent withthe individual’s belief. The weight (1¡° ¡¸) given
to¼isameasureof thedegreeof confidence whichtheindividualholds inthisbelief. The
core belief of a neo-additive capacity represented bythe additive probability distribution
¼ can be determined endogenously in equilibrium
2. Thus, standard equilibrium analysis
is always the special case of full confidence, ° = ¸ = 0:
Positive parameters ° and ¸ represent the impact of pessimism and optimism respec-
tively. Neo-additive capacities can therefore model psychological phenomena such as
excessive optimism andpessimism whichhave beenput forwardas explanations for eco-
nomic behavior in depressions or bubbles and which have been confirmed in laboratory
experiments.
In this section we show by example that optimism and pessimism can explain behavior
2 Eichberger & Kelsey (2000) provide a thorough analysis of strategic games when beliefs are
modelled as non-additive capacities.
15inconsistentwithexpectedutilitymaximization. Inthesescases,optimismandpessimism
can help to explain well-known economic puzzles. We will reconsider the paradox of
people buying insurance and gambling, and we will review portfolio choice behavior
where one observes unreasonably high risk premia (the equity premium puzzle) and a
willingness to invest in high-risk stock of unknown start-up companies (the small stock
puzzle).
4.1 Insurance and gambling
The same individual is oftenobservedtobuy both insurance against risk and lottery tick-
ets. Asour introductory quotationof Adam Smithillustrates, suchbehavior is ubiquitous
but hard to reconcile with rational decision making based on probabilistic calculus. For
expected utility maximizers with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function such be-
havioris hardtoexplain.
3 Buying insurancesuggests apreference for reducedrisk, while
paying for a lottery implies preference for a risky gamble, often at very unfair odds.
To see how both types of behavior can be accommodated by a neo-additive capacity,
consider an individual endowed with wealth x, whose preferences over lotteries can be
represented by the Choquet expected utility of a neo-additive capacity, with parameters
° > ¸ ¸ 0 for the neo-additive capacity and utility index u (taken to be concave). This
individualfaces a(small) probability¼L of incurring aloss ofsize L. Insurance coverage
is available at a premium q. Also available at a price p is a lottery ticket that ‘wins’ with
(a very small ) probability ¼W and pays out the single prize of size W and otherwise
pays out nothing. Suppose that the individual views the event in which heincurs theloss
and the event in which he wins the lottery (should he purchase a ticket) are independent.
Further suppose that [° +(1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼L] ¢ L > q ¸ ¼L ¢ L: The weak inequality is a
feasibility condition for the insurance premium to cover at least the expected loss (andif
strict it means that the insurance coverage is actuarially unfair). The strict inequality is
satisfied if the individual has a positive degree of pessimism ° and if the potential loss
3 Friedman & Savage (1948) suggest an S-shaped von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
This approach to reconcile such behaviour has been critisised by Markowitz (1952). See Hirsh-
leifer & Riley (1992) for a discussion of the Friedman-Savage approach (pp. 26-28).
16L is sufficiently large.
The difference in the Choquet expected utilities between buying and not buying the in-
surance is
u(x¡ q)¡ ([¸+ (1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ (1¡ ¼L)] ¢ u(x) +[° + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ ¼L] ¢ u(x¡ L))
¸ u(x¡ q)¡ u([¸ + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ (1 ¡¼L)] ¢ x +[° + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ ¼L] ¢ (x¡ L))
= u(x¡ q)¡ u(x¡ [° + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¼L]L) > 0
The first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality applied to the convex function ¡u,
and the second inequality follows from monotonicity of u. Figure 4 illustrates the desir-
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Having purchased the insurance, the difference in Choquet expected utilities between
buying the lottery ticket and not may now be expressed as
[¸ +(1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼W] ¢ u(x+ W ¡ p¡ q)
+[° + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢ (1 ¡ ¼W)] ¢ u(x¡ p¡ q)¡ u(x¡ q)
17> ¸¢ u(x+ W ¡ p ¡ q) +(1 ¡ ¸)¢ u(x¡ p ¡ q) ¡ u(x ¡ q)
¸ ¸¢ [u(x +W ¡ p¡ q) ¡ u(x¡ q)]¡ p ¢ u0(x¡ q):
The last inequality follows from the concavity of u: For ¸ > 0 and u strictly increasing,
thereisalottery(W;¼W;p)withW highenoughand¼W smallenoughsuchthat¼W¢W <
p and




Notice that this is true for any degree of concavity of u: Optimism makes lotteries with
highprizes andlowprobabilitiesofwinningattractiveevenforindividualswhoareaverse
to acceptingactuariallyfair fifty-fifty gambles. Figure 5illustrates the desirability of the
purchase of an unfair lottery ticket for the case where u is affine.
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There are numerous puzzles in portfolio choice theory. Thaler (2000) provides a
18stimulatingexpositionof some well-knownirregularities. Thesepuzzles highlight incon-
sistencies between standard economic theories and empirical regularities. Naturally, not
all can be related to optimism or pessimism. The following two puzzles however can be
explained easily by a small degree of optimism and pessimism.
The equity premiumpuzzle refers to the large difference between the average return on a
stock portfolio and the return of a fixed interest bearing bond which was first noted by
Mehra & Prescott (1985). The implied risk premium appears to be too big to be
explained by risk aversion as modelled by a concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
function. The conservative behavior in the face of uncertainty suggested by such a high
risk premium stands in stark contrast to the observation that small firms with high-risk
stocks seem to attract investors’ interest more than is warranted bytheir average returns.
To invest in stock of young ‘‘promising’’ companies appears to be extraordinarily risky.
Yet such uncertainty did not deter investors who otherwise requested a surprisingly high
risk premium.
We study a simple financial market system with a representative investor, one risky and
onerisklessassetand anexogenoussupply ofassets. This framework sufficestoillustrate
the impact of optimism and pessimism on portfolio choice. With well-known modifica-
tions these results carry over to more general models of financial markets.
Consider an investor with initial wealth W0 who can invest in two assets, a stock with
uncertain returns and a bond with a certain payoff. The following table summarizes the
notation of the assets.
asset quantity price payoff in state s 2 S
stock a q rs
bond b 1 r
Preferences of the investor are represented by a Choquet expected utility V(W1;:::;WS)
of end-of-period wealth, Ws = rs ¢ a + r ¢ b; with respect to a neo–additive capacity
V(W1;:::;WS)
:= ° ¢ minfu(W1);:::;u(WS)g +¸ ¢ maxfu(W1);:::;u(WS)g




Using the budget constraint, W0 = q ¢ a + b; to substitute for the bond, one gets wealth
19as a function of stock transactions a,
Ws = r ¢ W0 +[rs ¡ q ¢ r] ¢a:
Denoting by r = maxfr1;:::;rSg and r = minfr1;:::;rSg the maximal and minimal
returns of therisky stock,one can write theChoquet expectedutility from a stock invest-
ment a > 0 as
V (a) := ° ¢ u(r ¢ W0 + [r ¡ q ¢ r]¢ a)
+¸ ¢ u(r ¢ W0 + [r ¡ q ¢ r]¢ a)
+(1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u(r ¢ W0 + [rs ¡ q ¢ r] ¢ a):
For a stock market equilibrium price q¤ with an aggregate endowment of equity A > 0
and bonds B = 0 where the single investor maximizes Choquet expected utility V (a);
V 0(A) = ° ¢ u0(r ¢ W0 + [r ¡ q¤ ¢ r] ¢ A)¢ [r ¡q¤ ¢ r]
+¸¢ u0(r ¢ W0+ [r ¡ q¤ ¢ r] ¢ A)¢ [r ¡ q¤ ¢ r]
+(1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(r ¢ W0 + [rs ¡ q¤ ¢ r] ¢ A)¢ [rs ¡ q¤ ¢ r] = 0
must hold in equilibrium. Substituting for the initial wealthW0 = q¤¢A;this equilibrium
condition can be solved explicitly for the equilibrium stock price q¤;
q
¤ =
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) ¢ r +¸ ¢ u0(r ¢ A) ¢ r + (1¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)¢ rs
r ¢
·
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A)+ ¸ ¢ u0(r ¢ A) +(1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸)¢
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
¸ : (*)
The case of subjective expected utility, ° = ¸ = 0; is the reference situation against











¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
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The smaller q¤ the greater the equity premium.
Consider first the case of a risk-neutral investor, u0(¢) = k: In this case, the equilibrium





























¢ [° ¢ (r ¡ E¼rs) +¸ ¢ (r ¡ E¼rs)];




Sincer > E¼rs > r;optimismwilladdapositivepremium,¸¢(r ¡ E¼rs);tothereference
price q¤
0; while pessimism will make the premium negative, ° ¢ (r ¡ E¼rs): For a risk-
neutral investor, we can note that
² the equity premium will be the higher the more pessimistic the investor is, i.e. the
smaller °;
² if there is no optimism, ¸ = 0; then the equity premium required by a pessimistic
investor will be strictly higher than the one based on the subjective probability distri-
bution ¼ alone, ®(q¤) > ®(q¤
0);
² if both optimism and pessimism prevail, but ° > ¸ as in most experimental studies,
thena sufficient conditionforanequitypremium ®(q¤) exceeding®(q¤
0) is an average




For a risk-averseinvestor witha strictly decreasing marginal utilityfunction u0(¢) similar
results can be deduced which we summarize in a lemma.
Lemma 4.1 A risk-averse and pessimistic investor , i.e., with ¸ = 0, ° > 0; u0(¢)







In recent years ‘‘new stock markets’’ have emerged in many developed countries where
stock of start-up firms is traded. These markets were opened in order to provide ven-
21ture capital for new high-risk enterprises with great potential. In the light of the rather
conservative behavior reflected in the equity premium puzzle it is even more surprising
that investors were willing to bet substantial amounts of wealth on firms with no record
of earnings.
Optimism and pessimism as modelledwith a neo-additive capacity enables us to explain
such behavior. In fact, we can show that for an arbitrary small degree of optimism there
are maximal returns of a firm high enough to induce a positive stock price for high-risk
firms with potentially high returns. Reconsider the stock market equilibrium price of
Equation(*) andassume, without lossof generality,that the firm’s stockpays off areturn
R only in state1. Hence, r = r1 = Rand r = rs = 0for all s 6= 1: Suppose the expected






¸ ¢ u0(R ¢ A)¢ R +(1¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼1 ¢ u0(R¢ A) ¢ R
° ¢ u0(0) +¸ ¢ u0(R¢ A) +(1 ¡ ° ¡ ¸) ¢
"









u0(R ¢ A) ¢ [¸ + (1¡ ° ¡¸)¢ ¼1]









where the first inequalityfollows from u0(0) ¸ u0(R¢A) and the second strict inequality
from the positive expected return.
It is clear that with some optimism, ¸ > 0; even a vanishing probability of success ¼1
willnot deter investorsprovidedthereturnrisessufficiently,R ¸ ·=¼1:Thestockmarket
price will not collapse. There is nocontradiction if investors buyhigh-risk stock because
of optimism, ¸ > 0; and require an“excessive” equity premium. Adam Smith’s observa-
tionthateven“sober people”doplaylotteriesandRobertShiller’sobserved“exuberance”
in the stock market can be reconciled with rational decision making under uncertainty, if
one allows for optimism and pessimism as modelled by neo-additive capacities.
225. Behavioral axioms
We present our theory in the context of a variant of Savage’s (1954) purely subjective
uncertainty framework employed by Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001) and Ghi-
rardato, Maccherioni, Marinacci &Siniscalchi (2002)(hereafter,GMMS).
The state space S is taken to be the same as was defined in section 2 above. Let X, the
set of outcomes, be a connected and separable topological space. An act is a function
(measurable with respect to E) f : S ! X with finite range, F denotes the set of such
acts and is endowed with the product topology induced by the topology on X. We shall
identifyeachx 2 X withtheconstantact,f(s) = xfor all s 2 S. Foranypairof acts f;g
inF and anyevent E 2 E,fEg will denote theacth 2 F,formed from the concatenation
of the twoacts f and g, in which h(s) equals f (s) if s 2 E, and equals g (s) if s = 2 E.
Let % denote the individual’s preference relation on F: For any f 2 F, the certainty
equivalent of f, denoted by m(f), is the set of constant acts that are indifferent to f.
That is,x 2 m(f),if x » f. Althoughmanyconstantacts maybe equivalent, whenthere
is no risk of confusion, we shall write m(f) to indicate an arbitrary member of the set.
We say f and g are comonotonic if for every pair of states s and s0 in S, f (s) Â f (s0)
implies g(s) % g(s0).
Adopting Ghirardato and Marinacci’s (2001) nomenclature, we say an event
E 2 E is null (respectively, universal ) for a preference relation %, if xEy » y (respec-
tively, xEy » x) for all outcomes x;y 2 X, such that x Â y.
4 An event E 2 E, is
essential for % if for some x;y 2 X we have x Â xEy Â y. Let N (respectively, U and
E¤) denote the set of null (respectively, universal and essential) events.
For ease of exposition and without any essential loss of generality we assume there exist
outcomes 0 and M in X, that are, respectively, the ‘‘best’’ and ‘‘worst’’ outcomes in X,
in the sense that M Â 0 and M % x % 0 for all x 2 X.
Neo-additive capacitiesarea special case of the Choquet expectedutility theory. In order
to obtain a behavioral characterization, we seek to modify the axioms of GMMS appro-
4 This is weaker than Savage’s original notion of ‘null’ event which requires fEg » g for all f;g 2 F.
23priately. Their keyinnovationis to definea behavioraldefinitionof ‘subjectivemixtures’
of acts which allows them to define in a Savage framework of purely subjective uncer-
tainty, analogs to axioms based on probability mixtures that play such a key role in the
Anscombe-Aumann framework.
The first axiom requires the preference order to be a complete preorder.
Axiom 1 (Ordering)
The preference relation % on F is complete, reflexive and transitive.
Theneo-additiveexpectedutilityrepresentationallowsforthediscontinuousover-weighting
of events on which extreme, i.e. either best or the worst, outcomes obtain. Hence, stan-
dard continuity with respect to the product topology cannot be expected to hold for the
whole preference relation. Following Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001) we only
require a weaker notion of pointwise convergence, where in this product topology, we
say a net ff®g®2D µ F converges pointwise to f 2 F, if and only if f®(s) ! f (s)
for all s 2 S.
Axiom 2 (Continuity).
Let ff®g®2D µ F be a net that converges pointwise to f and such that all f®s and f are
measurable with respect tothe same finite partition.. If f® % g (respectively, g % f®) for
all ® 2 D, then f % g (respectively, g % f).
We also adopt the monotonicity axiom of Chew & Karni (1994) which combines
statewise dominance with a weakening of Savage’s axiom P3.
Axiom 3 (Eventwise Monotonicity).
For anypair of acts, f;g 2 F, if f (s) % g (s) for all s 2 S, then f % g.
In addition, for any triple of outcomes x;y;z 2 X, and any event E 2 E
(a) if E = 2 N and x % z, y % z then x Â y ) xEz Â yEz;
(b) if E = 2 U andz % x, z % y then x Â y ) zEx Â zEy.
As Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001) note, Axioms 1 and 3 imply that the sets of
null, universal and essential events form a partition of E.
The next axiom due to Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001) builds on the idea of
24Nakamura (1990) and Gul (1992) of a ‘subjective mixture’ of two acts f and g.
Fixsomeevent E,and then constructstatebystatean act whichyields at eachstate s, the
certainty equivalent of the bet f (s)Eg (s). Formally, the statewise (event) E-mixture of
f and g, denoted as fEg, is taken to be the act
fEg (s) = m(f (s)Eg (s)).
Adopting the shorthand fx;yg % z for x % z and y % z, and z %fx;yg for z % x and
z % x, the next axiom may be stated as follows.
Axiom 4 (Binary Comonotonic Act Independence)
For any event A 2 E¤, anyevent B 2 E, and for all f;g;h 2 F, such that f = xAy, g =
x0
Ay0, h = x00
Ay00. If f;g;h are pairwise comonotonic, and fx;x0g % x00 and fy;y0g % y00
(or x00 % fx;x0g and y00 % fy;y0g), then
f % g ) fBh % gBh.
As its names suggests, Binary Comontonic Act Independence, means that the preference
relation restricted to acts that are measurable with respect to two-element partitions, con-
forms to the theory of Choquet Expected Utility. With these four axioms, Ghirardato
& Marinacci (2001) were abletoprovethat the preference relation admits what they
dubbed a(canonical) biseparablerepresentation, namely,a Choquet Expected Utility rep-
resentation defined on this restricted set of acts.
Proposition 5.1 (Ghirardato and Marinacci [2001, Theorem 11]) LetX beaconnected
and separable topological space andlet % be abinaryrelation onF for whichthereexist
outcomes 0 and M in X, such that M Â 0 and M % x % 0 for all x 2 X. Then the
following are equivalent:
(i) % satisfies Axioms 1-4 and there exists an essential event A.
(ii) There exists a continuous utility index u : X ! [0;1] and a capacity º : E ! [0;1]









25Furthermore, if the set of essential events E¤ is non-empty then the capacity in (2) is
unique and the utility index in (2) is unique upto positive affine transformations.
Proposition 5.1 implies that events E 2 E are null if and only if º(E) = 0; universal if
and only if º(E) = 1 and essential if and only if 0 < º(E) < 1 holds.
It remains to impose an appropriate version of an independence-type axiom that extends
the biseparable CEU representation obtained in Proposition 5.1 to the whole domain F
and moreover entails that the capacity in that representation is neo-additive.
To do this, we first need to define GMMS’s notion of a ‘subjective mixture’ of two acts.
We begin with their definition of a ‘preference average’ of two consequences..
Definition5.1 Fix x;y 2 X, such that x Â y. We say that a consequence z 2 X is a
preference average of xand y (given E) if x % z % y and
xEy » m(xEz)E m(zEy)
Ghirardato & Marinacci (2001)showthatourAxiomsA1toA4together withthe
connectedness of X imply that the preference average in Definition 5.1 is well-defined.
The reason for their nomenclaturebecomes apparent if we consider for apreference rela-
tion that satisfies Axioms 1-4, the preference average of x and y given an essential event
E. From Proposition (5:1) we obtain the equality
º (E)u(x) + (1¡ º(E))u(y)
= º (E)u(m(xEz)) + (1¡ º(E))u(m(zEy))
= [º(E)]
2u(x) + 2º (E)(1 ¡ º(E))u(z)+ (1 ¡º (E))
2u(y).








which is independent of E. We shall thereforedenote by(1=2)x©(1=2)y the preference
average of the outcomes x and y. To deliver weighted averages of x and y, we follow
the line of argument detailedinGMMS. That is, by using iteratedaverages (for example,
(1=2)x © ((1=2)x© (1=2)y) corresponds to a (3=4;1=4)¡weighted average of x and
26y) and appealing to standard continuity arguments, it is possible to identify, for any ® in
[0;1] and every x and y in X, the weighted preference averages characterized by
u(z) = ®u(x) + (1¡ ®)u(y). (3)
With slight abuse of notation, we shall let ®x © (1¡ ®)y (or, equivalently, (1¡ ®)y ©
®x) denote an arbitrary element of the indifferent set of outcomes for such preference
averages. We are now in a position to define subjective mixtures of acts.
Definition5.2 Fix f;g 2 F and ® 2 [0;1]. A subjective mixture of f and g with
weight ® is any act h 2 F such that h(s) » ®f (s)© (1 ¡ ®)g (s) for each s 2 S.
As GMMS note, all subjective mixtures of f and g with weight ® are state-wise in-
different, and hence by Axiom 3 (i), indifferent. So we follow them and denote by
®f © (1¡ ®)g any one of them.
Ourfinalaxiomiskeytocharacterizingthedecisionmaker’s attitudes towardseventsthat
yield extreme outcomes. We first need, however, to define for each act which events the
decision maker views asyieldingthe extreme outcomes. We begin withpreference-based
definitions for the infimum and the supremum of an act.
Definition5.3 Fix f 2 F. An outcome z 2 X is said tobe in the indifference set of the
infimum of f, z 2 infº(f),if for A := f¡1(x : z Â x), zAf » f and if for every y Â z
and B := f¡1(x : y º x), yBf Â f. Similarly, an outcome z 2 X is said to be in the
indifference set of the supremum of f, z 2 supº(f) if for A := f¡1(x : x Â z), zAf » f
and if for every y suchthat z Â y and B := f¡1(x : x º y), f Â yBf.
Although infº(f) and supº(f) are defined to be indifference sets of outcomes, when
there is no risk of confusion, we shall write infº(f) and supº(f) to indicate arbitary
members of these respective sets.
From the definition of a subjective mixtureand equation (3)it follows that for every f;g
2 F, ® 2 [0;1] and s 2 S
u(®f (s) © (1¡ ®)g (s)) = ®u(f (s)) + (1¡ ®)u(g (s)).
27Hence, if there is a non-null event on which both acts f and g attain their supremum,
that is, the set E =
©




s 2 S : g (s) 2 supº(g)
ª
is not null,
then asubjective mixture of these two acts will also attain its supremum onthis set. That
is, for any ® in (0;1), ®f © (1¡ ®)g(s) 2 supº(®f © (1 ¡ ®)g), for all s 2 E.
On the other hand, if the set E is null, then a subjective mixture of these acts need not
necessarily attain its supremum on any state in
©





s 2 S : g (s) 2 supº(g)
ª
. In this case, the supremum attained will be less than
thatwhich wouldhavebeenattainediftherehadbeenacommonnon-nullevent onwhich
bothacts attained their supremum. Similarly, if theset F = fs 2 S : f (s) Â infº(f)g [
fs 2 S : g (s) Â infº(g)g is not universal, then for any ® 2 (0;1), ®f © (1¡ ®)g (s)
2 infº(®f © (1 ¡ ®)g), for all s = 2 F. While the infimum attained for that subjective
mixture would be no smaller if the set F were universal.
The idea behind the next axiom is that if the decision maker is sensitive about extreme
events,bothfor goodandbadoutcomes, thensubjectivemixturesof actsforwhichsupre-
mum outcomesareobtained on common non-null events will be viewed relativelyfavor-
ably while subjective mixtures of acts for which infimum outcomes are obtained on a
common event whose complement is not universal will be viewed relatively unfavor-
ably.
To facilitate the formulation of this final axiom, define an act h to bea member of F(f),
if the set of states on which a non-infimum outcome obtains either for h or for f is not
universal. That is,
F(f) := fh 2 Fj fs 2 S : f (s) Â infº(f)g\fs 2 S : g (s) Â infº(g)g = 2 Ug:
Similarly, denote by F(f) the set of acts with some maximum outcomes on a common













In GMMS’s axiomatization of Choquet Expected Utility, their key axiom is the restric-
tion of an independence type axiom to subjective mixtures of co-monotonic acts. The
28Choquet integral of a neo-additive capacity satisfies the independence axiom for all acts
with the best and worst outcomes on the same events, respectively. Hence, we effec-
tively strengthen their co-monotonic independence axiom by requiring it to hold for all
acts which obtain their supremum (and, respectively, their infimum) on some common
non-null event in common.
Axiom 5 (Extreme Events Sensitivity)
For any f;g;h 2 F such that f » g and h 2 F(g) \F(g), and any ® 2 (0;1],
1. If h 2 F(f) then ®g © (1 ¡ ®)h % ®f © (1¡ ®)h;
2. If h 2 F(f) then ®f © (1 ¡ ®)h % ®g ©(1¡ ®)h.
Acts that are comonotonic withf are elements of F(f)\F(f). Hence Axiom 5implies
comonotonicindependencefortheindifferencerelation. Intheproofofourrepresentation
result, we show that in conjunction with the other axioms it characterizes a subclass of
the family of Choquet expected utility functionals.
Theorem 5.1 Let X be a connected and separable topological space, let E¤ contain at
least four elements E1;E2;E3 and E4 that together form a partition of S, and let % be a
binary relation onF for which there exist outcomes 0and M inX,suchthat M Â 0and
M % x % 0for all x 2 X. The following two statements are equivalent:
1. The preference relation % on F satisfiesOrdering,Continuity, Eventwise Monotonic-
ity, Binary Comonotonic Act Independence and Extreme Events Sensitivity.
2. There exists a unique neo-additive capacity º on E and a continuous real-valued func-
tion u on X, unique up to positive affine transformations, such that for all f; g 2 F
f % g ,
Z





29why the set of possible events E¤ was required to have at least three non-intersecting
elements but had to have at least four such events in the latter. In Proposition 3.1 three
sucheventsarerequired to make statement (ii a) meaningful but this statement had not to
be derived. InTheorem5.1 four non-null andnon-universalevents arenecessary in order
to prove that thecapacityº whichwe deduce satisfies statement (ii a) of Proposition3.1.
In order to see that four states are necessary for º to satisfy statement (ii a), consider the
following counterexample. The capacity º on S = fs1;s2;s3g defined by
º(s1) = 1
2; º(s2) = 1
3; º(s3) = 1
4;
º(fs1;s2g) = º(fs1;s3g) = º(fs2;s3g) = 1
2
satisfies statements (ii b) and (ii c) but not (ii a) of Proposition 3.1 Hence, it is not neo-
additive.
6. Concluding remarks
Optimism and pessimism have long been recognized as important determinants of eco-
nomicbehavior. Subjectiveexpectedutilitytheoryassumes that theimpact of uncertainty
can be reduced to the statistical properties of a probability distribution. This reduction
extends economic analysis to situations under uncertainty where one could rightfully ne-
glect psychological aspects relating to the focal attraction of the best and worst outcome
of economic choices.
Inthispaper we haveintroduced aspecial caseof capacityand its Choquetintegralwhich
captures aspects of optimism andpessimism without abandoningthe subjectively proba-
bilisticapproach all together. Inparticular,subjective expected utilityis alwayscontained
as a special parametriccaseinthis approach. Moreover, asinEichberger & Kelsey
(2000), the additive part of a neo-additive capacity can be determined endogenously in
equilibrium.
Most importantly neo-additive capacities open new avenues of research. It appears nat-
ural to view the degree of confidence which a decision maker holds in a probabilistic
assessmentof anuncertainsituationas dependent onpast experienceandsubject to influ-
30ence from other people’s beliefs. Optimism and pessimism may spread in a population.
Attitudes towards uncertain outcomes may be contagious leading to general swings in
optimism and pessimism. So ‘‘irrational exuberance’’ as observed by Shiller (2001)
may become amenable to formal economic analysis after all.
31Appendix A: Proofs
For notational convenience, let b E := fE 2 Ej 0 < º(E) < 1g.
The following preliminary lemma establishes uniqueness of °; ¸; and ¼:
Lemma: Let º be a capacity on (S;E); where b E contains at least three elements E1, E2,
and E3, such that Ei \Ej = ?, for all i 6= j. Then (°;¸;¼) is unique.
Proof. Let (°;¸;¼) be a given vector of parameters of º: Denote by ® := 1¡° ¡¸ and
e ¼(E) := ® ¢ ¼(E) for all E 2 E:
For any E;F 2 b E such that E \F = ; and E [F 2 b E, e ¼(E) is uniquely defined by
e ¼(E) := º(E [ F) ¡ º(F):
Assume nowthat E 2 b E, then there exists (E1;E2) 2 b E £ b E such that E1 \E2 = ; and
E1 [E2 = E: Hence, e ¼(E) is uniquely defined by e ¼(E) = e ¼(E1)+ e ¼(E2):
This implies that e ¼(E) is uniquely defined for all E 2 b E and that ¸ is uniquely defined
by ¸ := º(E) ¡ e ¼(E) for all E 2 b E:




Hence,° isunique. Finally,either ® = 0andthereis no¼ intheexpressionof º; or® > 0
and ¼ is uniquely defined for any E 2 b E by ¼(E) :=
e ¼(E)
® :
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
(i) =) (ii). This follows from the definition of a neo-additive capacity.
(ii) =) (i).
(a) First we define a non-negative simple additive measure e ¼ on b E:
Case 1: E 2 e E := fE 2 b Ej 9 F 2 b E; E \ F = ;; E [ F 2 b Eg:
Define e ¼(E) := º(E [ F) ¡ º(F) for all F 2 b E such that E \ F = ;; E [ F 2 b E.
Property (a) implies that e ¼(E) is well-defined.
Case 2: E 2 b E ¡ e E: Hence F = S ¡ E = 2 e E and there exists a finite partition of E ,
32fEi 2 e Ej i = 1;:::;ng: Define e ¼(E) :=
n P
i=1
e ¼(Ei): It is well defined because
n X
i=1
e ¼(Ei) = [º(E1 [::: [En) ¡ º(E2 [::: [En)]
+:::: +[º(En¡1 [En) ¡º(En)] + e ¼(En)
= º(E) ¡ º(En) + e ¼(En)
= º(E) ¡ º(F)+ e ¼(F):
Monotonicity of º implies that e ¼(E) ¸ 0 for all E 2 b E:
Let us check now:
e ¼(E [F) = e ¼(E)+ e ¼(F)
for all E;F 2 b E such that E \ F = ;; E [ F 2 b E.
If E [ F 2 b E ¡ e E then this follows directly from Case 2.
IfE[F 2 e E then,forG 2 b E suchthatG\(E[F) = ;andG[(E[F) 2 b E oneobtains
e ¼(E [ F) = º(E [ F [ G) ¡º(G)
= [º(E [F [G) ¡ º(F [ G)] + [º(F [ G) ¡ º(G)]
= e ¼(E)+ e ¼(F):
(b) Next we extend e ¼ on all of E to a non-negative simple additive measure.
Clearly, defining e ¼(E) = 0 for all E µ Z is consistent with the restricted additivity of
e ¼; i.e. e ¼(E [ F) = e ¼(E) + e ¼(F) for all E;F 2 E such that E \ F = ;; E [ F 2 b E:




To check that e ¼(S) is well-defined, let fFj 2 b Ej j = 1;:::;mg be another finite partition
of S; then one obtains























Let ® := e ¼(S): Clearly, ® ¸ 0:
33It remains to prove that e ¼(E[F) = e ¼(E)+e ¼(F) for all E;F 2 b E such that E\F = ;;
E [ F 2 b E: Since b E contains at least three elements, one can assume, without loss of
generality, that E = E1 [ E2 with E1;E2 2 b E; E1 \E2 = ;. Hence, e ¼(E) = e ¼(E1) +
e ¼(E2) and, from the definition of e ¼(S); the desired result follows.
(c)We prove that there exists ¸ 2 R+ such that º(E) = ¸ + e ¼(E) for all E 2 b E:
If E 2 b E ¡ e E then, from Case 2, there exists A 2 b E such that
º(E) = e ¼(E) + º(A) ¡ e ¼(A):
If E 2 e E thenthere exists F 2 b E and B 2 E suchthat E[F [B = S: Hence, one has
e ¼(E [F) = º(E [F)+ º(B) ¡ e ¼(B);
and, therefore,
e ¼(E) + e ¼(F) = º(E [F) ¡ º(E) +º(E)+ e ¼(B) ¡ º(B);
which gives
º(E) = e ¼(E)+ º(B) ¡ e ¼(B):
Hence,
º(A)¡ e ¼(A) = º(B)¡ e ¼(B)
for all A;B 2 b E:
It remains to check that the common value ¸ := º(A) ¡ e ¼(A) is non-negative. Let
E;F 2 b E satisfy Property (b) and consider A ½ E and B ½ F: Applying Property (a)
twice gives
0 · º(E)+ º(F) ¡ º(E [F) = º(A)+ º(B) ¡ º(A[B)
= º(A) ¡ e ¼(A) = ¸:
(d)We prove that ® + ¸ · 1.
By Property (c), there is E;F 2 b E such that
0 · º(E) + º(F)¡ º(E [F)
34= 1¡ º(S ¡ E)¡ º(S ¡ F) + º(S ¡ (E [ F))
= 1¡ (¸ + e ¼(S ¡ E))¡ (¸ + e ¼(S ¡ F))+ (¸ + e ¼(S ¡ (E [F)))
= 1¡ ¸ ¡ ®:
(e) Setting ° := 1 ¡ ¸ ¡ ®; we finally obtain: º(E) = ° ¢ ¹0(E) + ¸ ¢ ¹1(E) + (1 ¡
° ¡ ¸) ¢ ¼(E) for all E 2 E where, for 1¡ ° ¡ ¸ > 0; the probability measure ¼(E) is
defined by ¼(E) :=
1
1¡°¡¸ ¢ e ¼(E):
A.2 Proof of Lemma4.1
Proof. From Equation (*), we get
q¤ =
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A)¢ r + (1 ¡°)¢
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)¢ rs
r ¢
·
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) +(1 ¡ °)¢
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
¸
=










° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) + (1¡ °)¢
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
¸
<
° ¢ u0(r ¢ A)¢ r ¢ q¤










° ¢ u0(r ¢ A) +(1 ¡ °)¢
P
s2S









¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A) ¢ rs
P
s2S
¼s ¢ u0(rs ¢ A)
< r:
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Webeginwithan observation anda couple of preliminaryresults. Theobservationisthat
any actf 2 F maybe expressed as[x1 on E1;:::; xn on En], where fE1;:::;Engis the
coarsest finite %-ordered partition of S with respect to which f measurable. By that we
mean for any pair of states s;t 2 S, if both s and t are in some E 2 fE1;:::;Eng
35then f (s) = f (t), otherwise f (s) 6= f (t). Furthermore for any s 2 Ei and t 2
Ej, i < j implies f (s) % f (t). Throughout this proof, if an act is expressed in the
form [x1 on E1;:::; xn on En] then it should be taken as given that xi % xi+1, for
i = 1;:::;i ¡ 1. We also note that Axiom 5 (Extreme Events Sensitivity) and Axiom
1 (Ordering) imply that if the preference relation expresses indifference between two co-
monotonic acts then indifference is preservedwhen those two acts areeachmixed with a
third act that is pairwise co-monotonic with both.
Lemma: (Comonotonic Independence of Indifference) Axiom 5 implies that % satisfies
the following independence property for pairwise comonotonic acts. For any ® 2 [0;1]
and any three acts f;g;h 2 F, that are pairwise comonotonic, if f » g then ®f ©
(1 ¡ ®)h » ®g © (1 ¡ ®)h.
Proof : From the pairwise co-monotonicity of h with both f and g, it follows that h 2
F(g) \ F(g) and h 2 F(f) \ F(f). Hence Axiom 5 implies that ®f © (1¡ ®)h %
®g © (1¡ ®)h and ®g © (1¡ ®)h % ®f © (1¡ ®)h, as required. ¤
Finally we report GMMS’s result (2002, Proposition 6) that the triple (X;»;©) consti-
tutesamixtureset. That is,forallx;y 2 Xandall®;¯in[0;1],(M0)®x©(1¡ ®)y ½ X,
(M1) x 2 (1x © 0y), (M2) ®x © (1¡ ®)y = (1¡ ®)y © ®x (commutative law), and
(M3) ¯(®x© (1¡ ®)y) © (1¡ ¯)y = ®¯x © (1¡ ®¯)y (distributive law). Applying
this result state by state, to Definition 5.2 (the definitionof a subjective mixture of f and
g with weight ® in [0;1]) it readily follows that the triple (F;»;©) is also a mixture set
and hence exhibits the analogous properties.
Proof of Theorem 5.1-
1. Sufficiency
We first show that % has a CEU representation, Part (i), and then that the capacity is
neo-additive, Part (ii).
Part (i): % admits a CEU-representation. Let u(:) and º(:) be the continuous utility
indexandcapacityof thecanonicalbiseperablerepresentationthatfrom Proposition(5:1)
36we know% admits. Recall that u(:) represents % restricted to the constant acts, and that
V ([x1 on E; x2 on S ¡ E]) = º(E)u(x1) +(1 ¡ º(E))u(x2) represents % restricted
to the set of acts that are measurable with respect to a two-element partition of S.
Fix,f = [x1 on E1;:::; xn on En]. For each i = 1;:::;n, it follows from the definition
of © and the connectedness of X, that there exists a unique ¸i 2 [0;1] for which xi 2
¸iM © (1¡ ¸i)0 and a unique ºi for which
[M on E1 [::: [ Ei; 0 on Ei+1 [::: [ En] » ºiM © (1 ¡ºi)0.
Equation (3) implies that 1 ¸ ¸1 ¸ ::: ¸ ¸n ¸ 0 and 0 · º1 · ::: · ºn¡1 · 1.












¸1M © (1 ¡¸1)0 on E1
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By applying the comonotonic independence of indifference propertyof Lemma6.3 n¡1
times and utilizing the distributive law of (F;»;©), we obtain
f » (1¡ ¸1)0© (¸1 ¡ ¸2)[º1M © (1¡ º1)0] © (¸2 ¡ ¸3)[º2M ©(1¡ º2)0]





































applying the above methods we have
f % f





















































Part (ii): º satisfies conditions (ii) of Proposition 3.1.
(a) We prove that for any three events (E;F;G) 2 E¤ £E¤ £ E¤ such that E\F = ; =
E \ G, E [ F = 2 U, E [ G = 2 U.
º(E [F) ¡ º(F) = º(E [G) ¡ º(G);
Since there are at least four pairwise disjoint events in E¤; we can assume that there are
E;F;G 2 E¤ £ E¤ £ E¤ such that E \F = E \ G = F \ G = ; and E [F [G = 2 U.
The following lemma contains the key argument.
Lemma: If there are E¤ £ E¤ £ E¤ such that E \ F = E \ G = F \ G = ; and
E [ F [ G = 2 U. Then
º(E [F [G) ¡ º(F [G) = º(E [F) ¡ º(F): (*)
Proof: Assume, without loss of generality, º(E [F) · º(F [ G) and let ¯ 2 [0;1] be
such that º(E [ F) = ¯ ¢ º(F [ G): Consider
f : =
·
M on E [F





¯ ¢ M © (1¡ ¯)¢ 0 on F [G





M on F [G
0 on S ¡ (F [G)
¸
:

















¢ [º(E [F [G) + º(F)] =
1
2




¢ (º(F [G)+ º(E [F)):
Thus,weconcludeº(E[F[G)¡º(F[G) = º(E[F)¡º(F): ¤
Let us now show that (E;F;G) 2 E¤ £ E¤ £ E¤ such that E \ F = ; = E \ G;
E [ F = 2 U, E [ G = 2 U implies
º(E [F) ¡ º(F) = º(E [G) ¡ º(G):
Several cases have to be considered when F 6= G:
Case 1.1: F ½ G: Using Equation (*), we get
º(E [ G)¡ º(G) = º(E [F [(G ¡ F)) ¡ º(F [(G ¡ F))
= º(E [F)¡ º(F):
Case 1.2: G ½ F: Similar to Case 1.1.
Case 2.1 : F ¡ G 6= ; 6= G ¡ F and F \G 6= ; Using Equation (*), we get
º(E [F)¡ º(F) = º(E [(F \G) [(F ¡ G)) ¡ º((F \G) [(F ¡ G))
= º(E [(F \G)) ¡ º(F \G)
= º(E [(F \G) [(G ¡ F)) ¡ º((F \G) [(G ¡ F))
= º(E [G) ¡ º(G):
Case 2.2: F ¡ G 6= ; 6= G ¡ F and F \ G = ; If E [ F [ G = 2 U, then the result
follows immediately from Equation (*).
39Suppose E [F [G 2 U. Since E¤ contains at least four elements we may assume that
one oftheeventsE;F or Gcanbepartitionedinto twoevents. Without lossof generality,
suppose E can be partitioned into E1 and E2. Then Equation (*) implies
º(E [F) ¡ º(F) = º(E1 [E2 [F)¡ º(F)
= [º(E1 [E2 [F) ¡ º(E1 [F)] + [º(E1[ F)¡ º(F)]
= [º(E2 [F) ¡ º(F)] + [º(E1 [F)¡ º(F)]
= [º(E2 [G)¡ º(G)] + [º(E1 [ G)¡ º(G)]
= [º(E1 [E2 [G) ¡ º(E1 [G)] + [º(E1[ G) ¡ º(G)]
= º(E [ G)¡ º(G):
(b) We prove that for some (E;F) 2 E¤£ E¤ such that E \F = ; and E [F = 2 U,
º(E [F) · º(E) + º(F):
Consider (E;F) 2 E¤ £ E¤ such that E \F = ; and E [F = 2 U. Assume, without loss
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¸
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2





Thus, we conclude º(E [ F) · º(E) + º(F):
40(c) We prove that for some (E;F) 2 E¤ £ E¤ such that E \F = ; and E [F = 2 U,
º(E [F) · º(E) + º(F):
Consider (E;F) 2 E¤ £ E¤ such that E \F = ; and E [F = 2 U. Assume, without loss
of generality, that º(S ¡ E) = ¯ ¢ º(S ¡ F) for some ¯ 2 [0;1]: Let
f : =
·




































¢ º((S ¡ E) [(S ¡ F)) ¸
1
2








¢ [(1¡ º(S ¡ F)) +(1 ¡ º(S ¡ E))] ¸
1
2
¢ [1¡ º((S ¡ E) [(S ¡ F))]:
Thus, we conclude º(E [ F) · º(E) + º(F):
2. Necessity.
The necessity of the representation follows straightforwardly from the definition of the
neo-additive representation and so the proof is omitted.
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